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Footnotes
1. Pennsylvania Department of State, available at http://www.dos.state.
pa.us/bcel/site/default.asp.
2. PA. CONST. art. V, § 15(b).
3. In 1993, Justice Papadakos was the only justice standing for reten-
tion.  It was a time when the state supreme court was dogged by
controversy that ultimately led to the impeachment of Justice Rolf
Larsen.  Justice Papadakos was personally criticized for standing for
retention when he would only be able to serve one year before
reaching the mandatory age of retirement, for hiring his son as a law
clerk, and for having voted to increase judges’ pensions.  Katherine
Seeyle, Papadakos Victory Sets New Low in Margin of Approval by
Voters, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Nov. 5, 1993.
On November 8, 2005, something happened inPennsylvania that has never happened before: anappellate judge, a supreme court justice no less, lost an
uncontested retention election.  Not only was the loss unprece-
dented, but with the exception of one retention election in
1993, appellate justices and judges in Pennsylvania routinely
have won retention by margins of 70% to 30%.  This year, one
justice lost his retention election and another barely won with
just 54% of the vote.
Retention elections have been a feature of judicial elections
in Pennsylvania since the state constitution was amended in
1969.  Following election to an initial 10-year term, judges may
file to stand for retention in an uncontested, nonpartisan elec-
tion, for successive 10-year terms until reaching the age of
mandatory retirement.  Retention elections, by their very nature
(uncontested, nonpartisan, seemingly with foregone conclu-
sions) traditionally have attracted little attention from the pub-
lic and the media.  Appellate justices and judges have not been
targeted in retention elections for decisions they had rendered
on the bench, and with one exception, were not identified as
judges who should be “voted out.” 
Two thousand five was the year this changed.  Typically, judi-
cial elections, and retention elections in particular, are low
turnout elections.  This year was no exception in that regard:
only 18.26% of registered Pennsylvania voters voted in Justice
Sandra Schultz Newman’s retention election, and only 17.87%
voted in Justice Russell Nigro’s retention election.1 What was
different was that voters paid attention to the retention elec-
tions and were motivated to vote “no” in a way they never had
before.
What accounts for this unprecedented event?  It is difficult
to make broad generalizations from such a low-turnout elec-
tion, but it seems that the retention elections turned into a ref-
erendum on the role of the courts in our system of governance
and the meaning of public service, especially as that relates to
compensation and the use of public funds.  In addition, this
election took on special importance as a target of grass-roots
activists eager to send a message that populist action can lead
to tangible results.  The court and the individual justices stand-
ing for retention likely would not have drawn such attention
were it not for the debate roiling around recent legislative
action regarding compensation for legislators, judges, and exec-
utive officials, and the lack of any other statewide races on the
ballot.
Given this special set of circumstances, some may be ready
to dismiss this election as an aberration.  It is premature, how-
ever, to do so.  History shows that judicial elections have tended
to become more partisan, more expensive, and more like con-
tests for other elected offices, not less.  This first retention elec-
tion of note may mark a point of departure for retention elec-
tions in Pennsylvania and may have important consequences
for judicial selection in Pennsylvania going forward.  Just as
important, the 2005 supreme court retention elections hold sig-
nificant import for the ongoing relationship between the public
and the courts and point out that work needs to be done to
improve that relationship.
HISTORY OF RETENTION ELECTIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA
Pennsylvania began using retention elections as the method
for determining whether a previously elected justice or judge
would continue to serve on the bench following a constitu-
tional change in 1969.  To be retained, a judge must receive at
least a 50% “yes” vote.2 From the first appellate retention elec-
tion following the constitutional amendment until 2005, no
appellate justice or judge failed to win enough votes to be
retained in office.  In fact, in only one race did an appellate jus-
tice not receive an overwhelming majority vote in favor of
retention; in 1993, Supreme Court Justice Nicholas P.
Papadakos retained his seat, but only 55% of the voters voted in
favor of retention.3
With the exception of 1993, retention elections in
Pennsylvania have not attracted widespread interest or atten-
tion.  There were no major campaigns in favor of or against
statewide justices or judges standing for retention, and the
jurists did not raise funds to cover campaign costs.  Essentially,
retention elections were non-events.  Even when retention
races started heating up in other states, we in Pennsylvania con-
sidered ourselves somewhat insulated from the activities that
were being observed elsewhere.
WHAT’S BEEN HAPPENING IN RETENTION ELECTIONS
ACROSS THE NATION
Throughout the nation, retention elections have become
more contentious as various groups have targeted judges who
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have authored opinions or rendered decisions with which the
groups have disagreed.  Typically, such elections have focused
on specific criminal sentencing decisions, abortion issues, and
gay marriage.
In its 2003 report Justice in Jeopardy, the ABA Commission
on the 21st Century Judiciary highlighted the threats it
observed to state judges standing for retention or reelection:
“[I]t is incumbents who are put at future risk of losing their
tenure when they uphold unpopular laws, invalidate popular
laws, or protect the rights of unpopular litigants.  In such cases,
it is incumbents who are thus presented with the impossible
choice of sacrificing either their careers, or their independence
and the rule of law.”4 The ABA Commission bolstered this find-
ing with evidence from retention elections throughout the
nation:
• In 1992, Florida Justice Rosemary Barkett’s retention was
opposed by the National Rifle Association and a group of
prosecutors and police officers, on the grounds that she was
“soft on crime.”
• In 1995, a sitting South Carolina justice was challenged for
the first time in over a century, on the grounds that she was
“soft on crime.”
• In 1996, the Tennessee Conservative Union and other
groups successfully campaigned for the defeat of Tennessee
Justice Penny White on account of a decision she joined
overturning a death sentence.  In the next election cycle,
Justice Adolpho Birch, Jr. resisted a challenge to his retention
based upon his decision in the same case.
• In the 1998 California Supreme Court elections, Chief
Justice Ronald George and Justice Ming Chin withstood
challenges to their retention based on their rulings in abor-
tion cases.
• In Florida, Justice Leander Shaw’s retention was opposed on
the basis of his ruling in an abortion case.
• In Ohio in 1998, opposition to Justice Paul Pfeifer focused
on his decision in a school-funding case decided under the
Ohio Constitution (and was an ancillary issue in the reelec-
tion battle of Resnick in 2000).5
The 2002 retention elections in Illinois and Missouri also
were heated affairs.  In Illinois, three circuit judges, fearing
possible opposition, raised money for a planned television
campaign to support their retention efforts.6 In 2004, reten-
tion elections were major focal points in four states: Missouri,
Arizona, Iowa, and Kansas.  In Iowa, Judge Jeffrey Neary was
targeted “because he granted a ‘divorce’ to a lesbian couple
who had split up after having
a civil-union ceremony in
Vermont.  The group [target-
ing the judge] sees that ruling
as a nod in the direction of
same-sex marriages in
Iowa.”7 Neary did win reten-
tion, garnering just 50% of
the vote.8 Similarly, in
Missouri, Judge Richard
Teitleman was targeted
because of his allegedly “lib-
eral activism,” but he too won
retention.9 In Kansas, District Court Judge Paula Martin was
retained, despite a campaign against her based on her sentenc-
ing decisions.10 “The campaign [against Martin] was the first
time in county history a judge faced formal opposition head-
ing into a retention election.”11 In Arizona, Maricopa County
Superior Court Judges Ken Fields and William Sargeant were
the targets of “vote no” campaigns based on their decisions in
some abortion cases.12 The leader of the anti-retention effort
admitted that “he couldn’t say either judge has a pattern of bad
decisions.  The campaign is based largely on the two abortion-
related decisions.”13 Despite the campaign, both Fields and
Sargeant were retained.
Pennsylvanians had felt fortunate that our retention elec-
tions had not become so polarizing or politicized.  Indeed, in
drafting merit-selection proposals for the statewide appellate
courts and even the local courts in Philadelphia, legislative
sponsors and Pennsylvanians for Modern Courts (“PMC”) had
always provided for a retention election following an initial
term in office.  PMC had hoped that retention elections in
Pennsylvania would remain an opportunity for voters to weigh
in on the judge’s performance on the bench, his or her fairness,
his or her treatment of litigants and witnesses, and the quality
of his or her work.
As will be seen below, the nature of retention elections in
Pennsylvania has now changed somewhat, but not in the way
many had predicted or expected.  PMC, however, still believes
that retention elections are an important part of the judicial
selection process, whether that process remains electoral or is
transformed into a merit-selection system.
WHAT HAPPENED IN 2005 IN PENNSYLVANIA?
In light of recent retention battles in other states, we
expected that any interest in retention elections in Pennsylvania
would be generated by controversial decisions rendered by
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Charles Thompson, Group Files Complaints Over Judge’s Campaign,
THE PATRIOT-NEWS, Oct. 21, 2005.  (At the time of this writing, the
State Department was investigating the complaint and the propriety
of the challenged contributions under the applicable campaign-
finance regulations).
19. Chief Justice Ralph Cappy, A Collaborative Effort of All Three
Branches of State Government Led to a Newly Enacted Compensation
System that Is Right for Pennsylvania, July 20, 2005, available at
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/index/Aopc/PressReleases/ope-
drjc.720.asp. 
20. Id.;  see also Act of July 7, 2005, P.L. 201, No 44 (repealed Nov. 16,
2005, §§ 1802-1808 (“Act 44”). 
judges during their tenure.
Indeed, it appears that
Justice Russell Nigro, one of
the two supreme court jus-
tices up for retention in
2005, shared these con-
cerns. In the months pre-
ceding his retention elec-
tion, his campaign commit-
tee raised funds in anticipa-
tion of having to run a cam-
paign to address negative
comments about some of
his rulings.14 As will be seen, however, the interest in the reten-
tion elections and the targeting of Justice Nigro (and Justice
Newman) were not directly related to any decisions they
authored or took part in while serving on the high court.
Justice Nigro’s fundraising was unprecedented and contro-
versial.  Justice Nigro promised that he would only use the
funds in the event he needed to respond to “an attack,” and
promised to return any unused funds.  “If no attack occurs, he
said, all of the money raised for a defensive ad campaign would
be returned ‘dollar for dollar’ to donors.”15
At the time Justice Nigro’s fundraising became public, it was
still widely assumed that any threat to the justices’ retention
bids would result from special-interest groups unhappy with
particular decisions.  One of the coordinators of Justice Nigro’s
fundraising campaign explained, “’He wants to have enough in
the bank so that if he has to conduct a six-to-eight-week con-
centrated media campaign to answer some off-the-wall out-of-
state group, he will have enough money to do that.’”16
Similarly, the Chancellor of the Philadelphia Bar Association at
the time stated, “‘I hope that we don’t have what has occurred
in other states—a single issue or agenda-driven campaign.’”17
Instead, the retention elections became a focal point of pub-
lic interest because they were the only elections for statewide
office this election cycle.  Public discontent surrounding late-
term legislation raising the pay of state legislators, judges, and
executive-branch officials was reaching a critical level.
Ironically, as will be discussed, a plan initially intended to
divorce judicial compensation from the political process
resulted in broad legislation affecting all three branches of gov-
ernment, allegations of a judiciary too closely tied to the legis-
lature, and the use of the political process to punish judges.
Ultimately, the campaign committees of both Justice Nigro
and Justice Newman raised substantial funds to support their
retention campaigns,18 although Justice Newman did not do so
until just before the election.
THE UNEXPECTED ISSUE IN THE RETENTION ELECTIONS
— THE PAY RAISE OF 2005
In fall 2004, Pennsylvania Chief Justice Ralph Cappy began
the process of seeking a pay raise for Pennsylvania’s justices and
judges.  Excluding annual cost-of-living increases, the judiciary
had not received a pay raise in 10 years.  As part of this process,
Chief Justice Cappy also proposed that judicial pay in
Pennsylvania be pegged to compensation for members of the
federal bench.  As he explained:
Properly structured, such coupling would recognize
the similarity in responsibilities between state judges and
their federal counterparts and would make state judges’
remuneration commensurate with our federal brethren.
On the “front” side of the equation, this linkage would
go far in attracting superior candidates to the judiciary
just as it would help retain judges who had begun to con-
sider alternative career options.  Perhaps most impor-
tantly, such a plan would take politics out of the pay raise
issue forever.19
Under his proposal, the judiciary would no longer be forced
to come to the legislature seeking raises.  Instead, when federal
salaries for judges increased, state salaries would increase as
well.  Chief Justice Cappy’s plan did not propose that appellate
and trial-level state court judges receive the same salary as their
counterparts on the federal district and appellate courts.
Instead, state supreme court justices would receive the same
salary as federal circuit court judges; intermediate appellate
court judges in Pennsylvania would receive the same salary as
federal district judges; and common pleas court judges would
receive the same salary as federal magistrate judges.20
This plan had much to recommend it.  The Pennsylvania
judiciary had not regularly received pay raises; each time such
a raise was sought it became tangled up with legislative pay
raises.  This new plan would enable the judiciary to maintain
some independence from the legislative branch by eliminating
the need for the judges to go “hat in hand” to the legislators.
Instead, the compensation of state judges would increase on a
par with that of federal judges.
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Chief Justice Cappy’s request for a judicial pay raise and pro-
posal of a new way to set judicial compensation was behavior
typical of the leader of the judicial branch.  Just as the chief jus-
tices of the U.S. and of other state courts must act as advocates
for the judges and the courts, Chief Justice Cappy asked for a
raise for his colleagues and proposed a plan for avoiding such
awkward requests in the future.
It is difficult to explain exactly what happened next, because
it did not happen during public hearings or open sessions of the
legislature.  Somehow, however, at the last moment, late at
night, just before the legislature adjourned for the summer,
broad legislation affecting compensation for members of all
three branches of government, including the judiciary, was
enacted:  “The Legislature just gave itself, top state officials and
judges pay raises up to 34 percent.  Gov. Ed [Rendell] approved
them.  This was done without public review or a word of debate
just after 2 a.m. on July 7.”21 The secretive, nonpublic nature
of the passage of the pay-raise legislation generated consider-
able criticism among the public and the media.  State
Representative Greg Vitali, a vocal critic of the pay-raise legis-
lation who later would participate as a plaintiff in a lawsuit
challenging the legislation’s constitutionality, characterized the
passage of the legislation this way:
The pay raise bill should have been read and dis-
cussed in public on three different days in the House and
again in the Senate before the vote July 7. . . . That didn’t
happen, as legislative leaders kept the details secret
before the 2 a.m. vote was finally held.  “If the Legislature
had been forced to discuss the raise in public before the
vote, the raise never would have happened.”22
As noted above, the discussions and negotiations leading up
to the drafting and amending of the bill were not public, and
the extent of Chief Justice Cappy’s participation in them is not
clear.  However, several sources have identified Chief Justice
Cappy as being very involved in designing the concept of the
pay raise.  For example, in an op-ed piece defending his deci-
sion to sign the pay-raise legislation into law, Governor Edward
G. Rendell wrote:  
This legislation, particularly the concept of linking
state salaries to a percentage of those paid equivalent fed-
eral officials, emanated from an idea put forth by our fine
Supreme Court Chief Justice Ralph Cappy.23
Chief Justice Cappy’s lawyer, in a letter to the Judicial Conduct
Board made public by the Administrative Office of
Pennsylvania Courts following the dismissal of a complaint
filed against Chief Justice
Cappy, wrote:  
As Chief Justice Cappy
discussed his proposal with
representatives of the sister
branches of government, it
became clear to him that its
best chance of success
would be as part of a broader
reform of compensation for
all three branches.  He there-
fore developed and began to
discuss scenarios that would tie pay in those branches to
counterparts in the federal system.24
The ultimate result of all this activity, Act 44, raised the com-
pensation for all state judges, legislators, and many executive-
branch officials.  Chief Justice Cappy’s plan of tying the com-
pensation of the state judiciary to federal levels was accepted
and adapted to apply to legislators as well. Members of the
Pennsylvania House and Senate would receive an annual salary
equal to 50% of the annual salary paid to members of the
United States House of Representatives.25 Legislative officers
and leaders would receive a greater percentage of the federal
salary, and all members would be eligible for cost-of-living
adjustments.26
In addition, one portion of Act 44 raised particular attention
from the media, the public, and several government watchdog
groups after the fact: Although the state constitution prohibits
legislators from raising their own compensation during their
term,27 the legislators inserted into Act 44 a provision enabling
them to begin receiving the increased salary immediately in the
form of “unvouchered expenses.”
1107.  Additional Expenses
(a) Senate
(1)Beginning on the effective date of this subsection
and ending November 30, 2008, a member of the
Senate shall receive monthly, in addition to any
allocation for clerical assistance and other actual
expenses, an unvouchered expense allocation in
the amount of 1/12 of the difference between:
(i) the amount specified for a member in:
(A) section 1102(a) (relating to members of
the General Assembly) plus section 1104
(relating to cost of living) as appropriate;
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or (B) section 1103(a) (relating
to legislative officers and lead-
ers) plus section 1104 as appro-
priate; and
(ii) the amount calculated for
that member as of the effective
date of this subparagraph pur-
suant to the act of September
30, 1983 (P.L. 160, No. 39),
known as the Public Official
Compensation Law.28
Similar language granted the same payments to members of the
House of Representatives.29
Years earlier, in 1986, the legislature had also used
unvouchered expenses as part of their increase in compensa-
tion.  This measure had been challenged, and ultimately upheld
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Consumer Party of
Pennsylvania v Commonwealth.30 The court drew a distinction
between salary and expenses, concluding that the use of
unvouchered expenses did not constitute an increase in salary.31
The reaction to the pay-raise legislation, and the manner in
which it was enacted, was sharp and immediate.  Many in the
media were angry, and the public was roused to action.
Lawsuits were filed in federal and state court challenging the
pay-raise legislation.32
Like Governor Rendell, Chief Justice Cappy made public
statements supporting the legislation.  In a press release issued
by the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts, Chief
Justice Cappy stated: 
“Raising public officials’ salaries is never popular and
there is never the ‘right time’ to do so. . . . Doing so now
was an act of courage by legislators, legislative leaders
and Gov. Rendell and I must acknowledge their leader-
ship on a difficult issue.”33
Chief Justice Cappy was also widely quoted as calling public
reaction to the pay raise “knee-jerk.”34 A complaint was filed
with the Judicial Conduct Board alleging that Justice Cappy’s
role in designing and defending the legislation was improper.35
The Judicial Conduct Board ultimately found the charges to be
without merit and dismissed the claim.36
Following these events, there was a pervasive sentiment that
the courts would not look favorably on challenges to the pay-
raise legislation, given previous decisions, including Consumer
Party, in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had upheld
previous legislation facing similar challenges to its mode of pas-
sage and the use of unvouchered expenses.37
New citizen groups sprang up, motivated to do something to
demonstrate that business as usual could not go on any longer
in Harrisburg.  Some called for a repeal of the legislation.  One
group, PACleanSweep, was founded in July 2005 with the goal
of replacing every Pennsylvania legislator standing for reelec-
tion in 2006.38 Others shared and still share that sentiment and
goal, but in 2005, no legislators were up for reelection.  Indeed,
only two officials who are voted on by the entire state were on
the ballot—Justices Nigro and Newman, who were standing for
retention.  
ELECTION SEASON
As the summer continued and anger over the pay raises did
not dissipate, but rather intensified, those calling for ouster of
the politicians soon found a new target—Justices Nigro and
Newman:
Anger unleashed by the legislative pay raise has given
rise to a familiar refrain:  Remember in November.  The
problem, for citizen activist groups, is that lawmakers are
not up for reelection till next year.
But some activists are now saying that voters can still
make their voices heard in November by removing two
members of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
They argue that the high court, whose members will
benefit from the pay raise, has allowed the General
Assembly to routinely pass bills that violate the state con-
stitution.39
Tim Potts, founder of Democracy Rising PA,40 began the
campaign against the justices, arguing ‘“The governor and the
legislature do what they do because the Supreme Court says it’s 
OK. . . . Over and over, they have given their blessing to stealth
legislation.’”41 Potts pledged to begin an internet-based cam-
paign to defeat the retention campaigns of Justices Nigro and
Newman.42 Other anti-pay-raise groups, including
PACleanSweep, pledged to support Potts’ efforts.43
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Justice, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 9, 2005 (“Nigro raised more than
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himself from lawmakers, stating that he had ‘voted to overturn the
Legislature when they’ve been wrong.’  Newman, a Republican, took
in more than $240,000 last week alone, and sponsored ads featur-
ing a voiceover by Tom Ridge, the former Pennsylvania governor
and former national Homeland Security secretary.”).
53. Mark Scolforo, Justices Spent Heavily in Lead-Up to Election,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 13, 2005.  
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
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At the time Potts announced his campaign, “[Justices]
Newman and Nigro said they knew of no campaign against
them and had no plans to publicly defend their records.”44
Justice Newman at that point still was not planning to raise any
campaign funds or campaign for retention, and Justice Nigro
had not spent any of the money he had raised and would “wait
and see” before mounting a responsive campaign.45
The allegations that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was, at
least partially, to blame for the legislature’s actions were not new.
In the past, the court had upheld other legislation in the face of
constitutional challenges to the manner in which the legislature
had enacted it.  (Of course, the court also had struck down
much legislation in the past as well, a fact that was often forgot-
ten during discussions about the pay-raise legislation.)  The
Consumer Party decision in 1986, decided before either Justice
Nigro or Justice Newman was on the court, had upheld the use
of unvouchered expenses by the legislature. This history, cou-
pled with Chief Justice Cappy’s role in and defense of the pay-
raise legislation, combined to create an impression of the court
being too close to, or at least too accepting of, the legislature.46
Adding to dissatisfaction with the courts was an examination,
less than two months before the election, of the reimbursement
forms submitted by Pennsylvania Supreme Court justices for
expenses they incurred.  The Harrisburg Patriot-News reported
that the seven justices were reimbursed for more than $164,000
in one year.47 It pointed out that these expenses were in  addi-
tion to the justices’ salaries and a generous benefits package that
included up to $600 per month for a car lease.48
The Patriot-News and follow-up articles in papers through-
out the state also highlighted certain expense reimbursements
that seemed to many to be out of line or inappropriate.  One
expense that was frequently cited by the media was Justice
Nigro’s request for reimbursement for at least 115 meals during
which court-related business was conducted:
No one wants high-powered lawyers to be buying din-
ner for someone who serves the public on the supreme
court, but did Justice Russell Nigro really conduct
“court-related business” at 115 meals charged to the tax-
payers?  And those dinners that cost him $100, $200 and
even more than $400—are they the kind of meals at the
same posh restaurants
he would have bought if
he were putting it on his
personal tab?  Yeah, we
didn’t think so.  (And
don’t get us started
about the $85 bottle of
wine.)49
Justice Newman’s
expenses didn’t draw the
same attention as Justice
Nigro’s, although she was
criticized for the generous
tips and also the seemingly
inexpensive food purchases for which she sought reimburse-
ment.50 Other justices’ expenses, such as Justice Thomas
Saylor’s request for reimbursement for 34 car washes,51 drew
attention and criticism, but it was Justice Nigro’s expenses that
the media highlighted.
Thus, what started out as a seemingly routine retention elec-
tion became a campaign in which Justices Nigro and Newman
were fighting to retain their seats.  Both resorted to media buys
in the days leading up to the election, including public endorse-
ments of Justice Newman by former Governor Ridge.52 All of
this activity was unprecedented in the realm of appellate court
retention elections in Pennsylvania.
By the time election day arrived, Justices Nigro and Newman
had spent a combined total of more than $800,000; the bulk of
the expenditures were in the two weeks leading up to election
day.53 As noted above, Justice Newman was retained with 54%
of the vote; Justice Nigro failed to win retention, receiving only
49% of the vote.  Interestingly, the local judges up for retention
were not targeted for “no votes,” and all were retained.
POSTSCRIPT:  THE PAY-RAISE REPEAL AND 
THE OUTCOME OF THE LITIGATION
During the fall, in response to the unrelenting attention and
pressure of the media and the public uproar about the pay-raise
legislation, the legislature debated repealing it.  Differences over
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whether to repeal the judges’
raises as well as the legislators’
raises held up passage, and no
compromise was reached in
advance of election day.  However,
the week after the election, the
legislature finally resolved to
repeal the pay-raise legislation.
Act 72, repealing the pay-raise
legislation, was passed on
November 1654 and signed by the
Governor.
The movement toward repeal was not enough to quiet the
“vote no” campaign, and it also failed to end the pay-raise con-
troversy.  Soon after the repeal became effective, several lawsuits
were filed by judges across Pennsylvania challenging the con-
stitutionality of the repeal as it related to judges.55 In addition
to seeking to have the pay raises for judges reinstated, the law-
suits highlighted the critical need to separate judicial compen-
sation from the legislative process.56 The suits were consoli-
dated and were argued before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in early April 2006, along with Gene Stilp’s lawsuit challenging
the original pay-raise legislation. 
The judges’ challenges to the repeal hinged on the provision
of the Pennsylvania Constitution that prohibits reducing a
judge’s salary while he or she is in office: “Justices, judges and
justices of the peace shall be compensated by the
Commonwealth as provided by law. Their compensation shall
not be diminished during their terms of office, unless by law
applying generally to all salaried officers of the
Commonwealth.”  The judges’ claim was based on the fact that
although the repeal affected all officials who had received a
raise through Act 44, some officials had not received such a
raise and thus did not have their salaries reduced by the repeal. 
In September 2006, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
accepting the judges’ constitutional argument, held that the
repeal of the pay raises was unconstitutional as to the judges.57
The court also found, however, that the unvouchered-expense
portion of the legislative raises was unconstitutional.  While
finding Act 44 unconstitutional in part, the Court refused to
apply the nonseverability clause of the pay-raise legislation.  As
a result, the provisions of Act 44 relating to judicial compensa-
tion were held to remain in force.
During the litigation and following the court’s decision,
there had been criticism that the justices were deciding a case
affecting their own compensation.  In response, by defenders of
the court and the court itself, it was explained that under the
“doctrine of necessity,” there was no alternative, and that
despite their own interest, the justices were required to deter-
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mine the case impartially.  As Judge Anne Lazarus, chairwoman
of the Ethics Committee of the State Conference of Trial Judges,
explained in an interview: “[The rule of necessity] holds that
whenever all judges in a particular court are touched by the
same conflict ‘it is necessary for a judge, even if conflicted, to
handle the controversy.’”58 While legally correct, this further
agitated the public and those calling for ousting all elected offi-
cials, including judges.
WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?
It is difficult to draw sweeping lessons from a low-turnout
election in which there was not wide polling of voters.  But,
judging from the tenor of the debate and the arguments being
made, PMC has discerned a central theme defining the 2005
retention elections.  Significantly, this theme is not new, and the
sentiments it represents have not been resolved.  
A FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE
PMC attributes the events of 2005 to a collision of incon-
gruous perceptions about the court system and its role in our
system of government:  the public and the judges (and their
defenders) have very different views about the courts and our
governmental system of checks and balances.  In fact, when one
reads what the “two sides” have to say about the situation, they
seem to be talking about entirely different things.  And, cer-
tainly, they are not really talking to each other. This underscores
a major problem—the isolation of courts and judges from the
people they serve. 
All the publicity about judicial elections, federal appoint-
ments, activist judges, and high-profile cases has obscured a
basic truth—the public does not really know all that much
about judges and courts.  A corresponding problem is that once
on the bench, judges often become isolated from the public and
seemingly “out of touch” with the common experience.  In
combination, these factors produce a condition ripe for explo-
sive results when issues of compensation, expenditures by pub-
lic officials, and political maneuvering arise.  
Even now, the two sides seem miles apart in their assessment
of what happened last fall.  Judges and their defenders (mostly
lawyers and the organized bar) seem not to understand the
public outrage connected with the pay raise and why any part
of it was directed at the court.  
For example, one lawyer, in an effort to exhort fellow
lawyers to support the courts, defended the chief justice’s role
in designing the pay raise and attacked the results of the reten-
tion election:
For almost six months there has been a persistent,
unrelenting diatribe from many in the print media across
the Commonwealth attacking our chief justice, our
It is difficult to
draw sweeping
lessons from a
low-turnout
election in which
there was not
wide polling of
voters.
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Supreme Court and our judiciary in general.  The dia-
tribe is frequently misleading, occasionally tasteless,
often threatening and evidences an alarming illiteracy as
to the operable provisions of the Pennsylvania constitu-
tion.59
This lawyer then criticized the vote against Justice Nigro’s
retention as “an irrational act, which again was the result of
actions by those who would undermine confidence in our jus-
tice system.”60 This echos Justice Nigro’s own assessment of his
electoral defeat:  “What they did was an irrational thing.  They
sent a misguided missile.”61
Furthermore, the judges and their defenders seem not to
understand why their efforts to attack the pay-raise repeal and
the court’s ultimate decision in the case, regardless of the legal
merits, were so distasteful to the public.  This failure to under-
stand, and the insistence on viewing the public’s ire as misdi-
rected and the court and judiciary as scapegoats can only lead
to further alienation and confrontation. 
On the other side, the public seems not to understand, or at
least to have lost faith in, the courts’ role in the system of checks
and balances.  The public seems unable to grasp that judges are
deserving of a pay raise and that Chief Justice Cappy’s request
for such a raise was reasonable and part of his duties.  The real
problem, which has been lost in the controversy, is that judges
are beholden to the other branches of government for their
compensation.  Rather than respect this bind and act responsi-
bly to ensure that our judges are fairly compensated, the legis-
lature traditionally has piggy-backed its own raises onto the
bills related to judges’ compensation.  As a result, lost in the
pay-raise, retention, and repeal controversies were Chief Justice
Cappy’s reasonable plan to end this cycle of long periods with-
out pay raises followed by turmoil over any ultimate legislation
increasing compensation.
Essentially, this is a classic failure to communicate.  The
courts are perceived as having lost touch with the people they
serve, and the people found the retention election was the only
way to effectively communicate their lack of faith in the system.
Another way must be found.  Targeting judges for “no” votes
when they stand for retention because of frustration about the
courts, or about government in general, in the long run
deprives Pennsylvania of good judges with solid experience.  It
may be part of our tradition, but it should not remain part of
our future.  
THE FUTURE OF RETENTION ELECTIONS
Retention elections, however, should remain part of
Pennsylvania’s judicial selection system, whether electoral or
merit selection.  Retention elections guarantee a role for the
public in the critically important judicial selection process.
While retention elections certainly can provide the opportunity
for misguided attacks, they also offer a voice to the people and
a real way to pass on a judge’s performance as a judge.  
Retention elections should not be referenda on hot-button
issues or a way to attack the only official up for election; but if
the right information gets out, if voters can be educated, it
could be a true assessment of how the judge is doing his or her
job.   Does she treat all fairly and with respect—litigants, wit-
nesses, jurors, court personnel?  Is the judge efficient in adju-
dicating cases?  Is the judge respected by the lawyers who prac-
tice before her, even when she rules against them?  How often
is the judge overturned on appeal?  How is the courtroom
run—efficiently, with respect to the parties involved, or simply
to serve the judge’s schedule?  Has the judge made efforts to be
out in the community—to educate and help the public learn
about courts and judges?
Perhaps the best way to look at retention elections is as an
opportunity for judges and the public to educate each other.
The public can educate the judge about its concerns for fair and
impartial courts, for strong courts that will ensure that the con-
stitutional system of checks and balances works, for efficient
and effective courts.  And the judge can educate the public
about what he or she does on the bench, how she views her
role, what she has learned during the preceding term.  This type
of education, and communication, is sorely needed.  But not
only during retention time.  There should be an ongoing con-
versation between the public and the judiciary, not about spe-
cific cases and controversial issues, but about systemic issues
and the role of the courts in our system of government.  
If we have these conversations, perhaps retention elections
can begin to fill the role they were always meant to play—nei-
ther a non-event rubberstamp for another 10 years in office, nor
a targeted campaign based on specific decisions or more general
discontent with government.  Instead, retention elections can
fill a void in our system—providing information so that the
public and the judiciary no longer hold incongruous views of
the courts and their role in our system of government.  
CONCLUSION
Real issues must be addressed if Pennsylvania is to have
strong courts that have the confidence of the public.  Two items
should be examined as part of this effort. First is the potential
use of judicial evaluation committees.  Second, in the wake of
ambiguity in the court’s decision about the permanence of the
mechanism of tying state judicial salaries to federal levels as
well as recent proclamations by state legislators that they will
essentially “undo” the effect of the court’s decision and find a
way to bring judicial salaries back to pre-pay-raise levels, there
is a need to discuss a new means of setting judicial compensa-
tion.  PMC is eager to explore both of these concepts, which
have been employed successfully in other jurisdictions.  
The first, judicial evaluation committees, would be formal
committees established by law and charged with evaluating
judges’ standing for retention.  Evaluations would be based on
the factors described above, including experience on the bench,
efficiency, demeanor, and the opinions of fellow jurists and
59. Edward W. Madeira, Jr., Chief Justice, Courts Deserve More Support
from Legal Community, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 30, 2006.
60. Id.
61. L. Stuart Ditzen, Nigro Calls Vote to Oust Him “An Irrational Thing,”
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Nov. 10, 2005.
practicing lawyers.  The ratings and recommendations would
be shared with the public, so that voters would be educated and
informed when entering the voting booth during retention elec-
tions.
The second concept, finding a new way to set judicial com-
pensation, would seek to divorce permanently the process of
setting judicial compensation from the state legislature.  This,
in effect, would achieve what Chief Justice Cappy originally
intended, eliminating for all time the need for the courts to go
asking for raises from the legislature.  Possible solutions include
setting up an independent judicial compensation commission,
tying judicial salaries to some outside index, or even imple-
menting Chief Justice Cappy’s proposal to tie judicial salaries to
those paid to members of the federal judiciary.  The point is that
the judicial compensation process we have now is not working.
There needs to be a change.
The public needs to have confidence in our courts.  This is a
big challenge, particularly in the wake of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court’s decision in the  pay-raise case.  But the work
of repairing the damaged relationship can and should begin
now.  We need and welcome willing partners in the judiciary
and the public.  We know that many within the judiciary and
the court system are interested in having this dialogue, as are
members of local and statewide bar associations.  We hope we
can broaden the conversation and work together to ensure that
we have strong courts in Pennsylvania.
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AMERICAN JUDGES ASSOCIATION
FUTURE CONFERENCES
Newport, Rhode Island
2007 Midyear Meeting
April 19-21, 2007
Hotel Viking
$169 single/double
Vancouver, British Columbia
2007 Annual Conference
September 25-30, 2007
Sheraton Vancouver Wall Centre
$229 Canadian single/double
Amelia Island, Florida
2008 Midyear Meeting
May 1-3, 2008
Amelia Island Plantation
$159 single/double standard room
$169 single/double deluxe room
Maui, Hawaii
2008 Annual Conference
September 7-12, 2008
Westin Maui
$190 single/double
Sanibel Island, Florida
2009 Midyear Meeting
May 14-16, 2009
Sundial Beach Resort
$145 single/double
